This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation, intended as beliefs buyers hold about seller's reliability, in the context of the Kenyan rose export sector. A model of reputation and relational contracting is developed and tested. We show that 1) the value of the relationship increases with the age of the relationship; 2) during an exogenous negative supply shock sellers prioritize relationships consistently with the predictions of the model; and 3) reliability at the time of the shock positively correlates with future survival and relationship value. Models exclusively focussing on enforcement or insurance considerations cannot account for the evidence.
Introduction
Imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real-life commercial transactions. In the absence of formal contract enforcement trading parties rely on informal mechanisms to guarantee contractual performance (see, e.g., Johnson, McMillan and Woodru¤ (2002) , Greif (2005) , Fafchamps (2006) ). Among those mechanisms, longterm relationships based on trust or reputation are perhaps the most widely studied and have received substantial theoretical attention. The theoretical literature has developed a variety of models that capture salient features of real-life relationships, e.g., enforcement problems (see, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomsom (1989), Murphy (1994, 2002) , Levin (2003) ), insurance considerations (see, e.g., Thomas and Worrall (1988)), or uncertainty over parties commitment to the relationship (see, e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996) , Watson (1999) , Halac (2012) ). While these di¤erent models share the common insight that future rents are necessary to deter short-term opportunism, they also di¤er in important respects. Empirical evidence on informal relationships between …rms, therefore, has the potential to identify which frictions are most salient in a particular context. In turn, such knowledge can be bene…cial for policy, particularly in a development context. Empirical progress in the area, however, has been limited by the paucity of data on transactions between …rms in environments with limited or no formal contract enforcement and challenges in measuring future rents and beliefs.
This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation, intended as beliefs buyers hold about seller's reliability, in the context of the Kenyan rose export sector. A survey we conducted among exporters in Kenya reveals that relationships with foreign buyers are not governed by written contracts enforceable in courts. The perishable nature of roses makes it impractical to write and enforce contracts on supplier's reliability. Upon receiving the roses, the buyer could refuse payment and claim that the roses did not arrive in the appropriate condition while the seller could always claim otherwise. The resulting contractual imperfections, exacerbated by the international nature of the transaction, imply that …rms rely on repeated transactions to assure contractual performance.
The analysis takes advantage of three features of this setting. First, unlike domestic sales, all export sales are administratively recorded by customs. We use six years of transaction-level data of all exports of roses from Kenya, including the names of domestic sellers and foreign buyers, as well as information on units traded, prices and date. Second, in the ‡ower industry direct supply relationships coexist alongside a well-functioning spot market, the Dutch Auctions. 1 If roses transacted in the relationships can be traded on the auctions, incentive compatibility considerations imply that the spot market price can be used to compute a lower bound to the future value of the relationship. Third, the reaction of the relationships to a negative exogenous supply shock induced by the post-election violence in January 2008 provides a unique opportunity to test the predictions of the reputation model and distinguish it from alternative models. 2 We …rst present a model of the relationship between a rose producer (seller) and a foreign buyer (buyer) At the time of the violence, exporters located in the region directly a¤ected by the violence could not satisfy commitments with all buyers. The violence was a large shock and exporters had to chose which buyers to prioritize. We document an inverted-U shaped relationship between the age of the relationship with the buyers and the reliability in supply at the time of the violence. The demonstrated reliability at the time of the violence correlates with relationship's survival and future values, but less 1 The "Dutch", or "clock", auction is named after the ‡ower auctions in the Netherlands. In a Dutch auction the auctioneer begins with a high asking price which is lowered until some participant is willing to accept, and pay, the auctioneer's price. This type of auction is convenient when it is important to auction goods quickly, since a sale never requires more than one bid. 2 Following heavily contested presidential elections in Kenya at the end of December 2007, several, but not all, regions of the country plunged into intense episodes of ethnic violence. Flower exporters located in regions where con ‡ict occurred suddenly found themselves lacking signi…cant proportions of their labor force and su¤ered dramatic drop in exports. In Ksoll et al. (2013) we document that at the average …rm in the con ‡ict region 50% of the labor force was missing and exports volumes dropped by 38% at the peak of the violence.
3 so in older relationships. Both facts are predicted by the reputation model and are not consistent with other models, e.g., those that exclusively focus on enforcement or insurance considerations. We discuss the policy implications of these …ndings, particularly from the point of view of export promotion in developing countries, in the concluding section.
The …ndings and methodology of the paper contribute to the empirical literature on relationships between …rms. McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) and Banerjee and Du ‡o (2000) are closely related contributions that share with the current paper a developing country setting. 3 In an environment characterized by the absence of formal contract enforcement, McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) …nd evidence consistent with long term informal relationships facilitating trade credit. Banerjee and Du ‡o (2000) infer the importance of reputation by showing that a …rm's age strongly correlates with contractual forms in the Indian software industry. Both McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) and Banerjee and Du ‡o (2000) rely on cross-sectional survey evidence and cannot control for unobserved …rm, or client, heterogeneity. In contrast, we exploit an exogenous supply shock and rely on within relationship evidence to prove the existence, study the source, and quantify the importance of the future rents necessary to enforce the implicit contract. Antras and Foley (2012) and Macchiavello (2010) are two closely related studies in an export context. Antras and Foley (2012) study the use of prepayment to attenuate the risk of default by the importer. Using data from a U.S. based exporter of frozen and refrigerated food products they …nd that prepayment is more common at the beginning of a relationship and with importers located in countries with a weaker institutional environment. Macchiavello (2010) , instead, focuses on the implications of learning about new suppliers in the context of Chilean wine exports.
In the context of domestic markets, particularly for credit and agricultural products, Fafchamps (2000 Fafchamps ( , 2004 Fafchamps ( , 2006 has documented the importance of informal relationships 3 Banerjee and Munshi (2004) , Andrabi et al. (2006) , Munshi (2010) provide interesting studies of contractual relationships in a development context, but with rather di¤erent focus. For example, Munshi (2010) and Banerjee and Munshi (2004) provide evidence on the trade enhancing role of long term relationships based on community ties. Andrabi et al. (2006) provide evidence of how ‡exible specialization attenuates hold-up problems. Hjort (2012) studies how ethnic divisions impact productivity using data from a Kenyan ‡ower plant. The literature on tied labour in rural contexts has studied the connections existing between spot markets and informal relationships (see, e.g., Bardhan (1983) and Mukherjee and Ray (1995) ).
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between …rms in Africa and elsewhere. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the industry, its contractual practices, and the ethnic violence. Section 3 introduces the model and derives testable predictions. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 provides a discussion of the …ndings. Sections 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks and policy implications. Proofs, additional results and further information on the data are relegated to an online Appendix.
Background
This section provides background information on the industry, its contractual practices and the ethnic violence. The section relies on information collected through a representative survey of the Kenya ‡ower industry conducted by the authors through face-to-face interviews in the summer of 2008.
The Kenya Flower Industry
Over the last decade, Kenya has become one of the largest exporters of ‡owers in the world. The ‡ower industry, one of the largest foreign-currency earners for the Kenyan economy, counts around one hundred established exporters located at various clusters in the country. Roses, the focus of this study, account for about 80% of exports of cut ‡owers from Kenya. Roses are a fragile and perishable commodity. To ensure the supply of high-quality roses to distant markets, coordination along the supply chain is crucial. Roses are hand-picked in the …eld, kept in cool storage rooms at a constant temperature for grading, then packed, transported to Nairobi's international airport in refrigerated trucks owned by …rms, inspected and sent to overseas markets.
The industry is labor intensive and employs mostly low educated women in rural areas. Workers receive training in harvesting, handling, grading, packing and acquire skills which are di¢ cult to replace in the short-run. Because of both demand (e.g. particular dates such as Valentines day and Mothers day) and supply factors (it is 4 Alongside a larger literature that studies formal contracts between …rms (see Lafontaine and Slade (2009) for a survey), some studies have focused on the relationship between informal enforcement mechanisms and formal contract choice (see, e.g., Corts and Singh (2004) , Kalnins and Mayer (2004) , Lyons (2002) , Gil and Marion (2010) ). With the exception of Gil and Marion (2010) , these papers also rely on cross-sectional data and proxy the rents available in the relationship with product, …rm, or market characteristics that might a¤ect contractual outcomes in other ways.
costly to produce roses in Europe during winter), ‡oriculture is a seasonal business.
The business season begins in mid-August.
Contractual Practices
Roses are exported in two ways: they can be sold in the Netherlands at the Dutch auctions or can be sold to direct buyers located in the Netherlands or elsewhere (including Western Europe, Russia, Unites States, Japan and the Middle East). The two marketing channels share the same logistic operations associated with exports, but di¤er with respect to their contractual structure. The Dutch auctions are close to the idealized Walrasian market described in textbooks. There are no contractual obligations to deliver particular volumes or qualities of ‡owers at any particular date.
Upon arrival in the Netherlands, a clearing agent transports the ‡owers to the auctions where they are inspected, graded and …nally put on the auction clock. Buyers bid for the roses accordingly to the protocol of a standard descending price Dutch auction. The corresponding payment is immediately transferred from the buyer's account to the auction houses and then to the exporter, after deduction of a commission for the auctions and the clearing agent. Apart from consolidating demand and supply of roses in the market, the Dutch Auctions act as a platform that provides contract enforcement between buyers and sellers located in di¤erent countries: they certify the quality of the roses sold and enforce payments from buyers to sellers. It is common practice in the industry to keep open accounts at the auctions houses even for those …rms that sell their production almost exclusively through direct relationships. The costs of maintaining an account are small, while the option value can be substantial.
Formal contract enforcement, in contrast, is missing in the direct relationships between the ‡ower exporter and the foreign buyer, typically a wholesaler. The export nature of the transaction and the high perishability of roses makes it impossible to write and enforce contracts on supplier's reliability. Upon receiving the roses, the buyer could refuse payment and claim that the roses sent were not of the appropriate variety and/or did not arrive in good condition. The seller could always claim otherwise. Accordingly, exporters do not write complete contracts with foreign buyers. 5 Exporters and foreign buyers negotiate a marketing plan at the beginning of the 5 Among the surveyed 74 producers, only 32 had a written contract with their main buyer. When a contract is written, it is highly incomplete. Among the 32 …rms with a written contract, less than a third had any written provision on the volumes, quality, and schedule at which ‡owers have to be delivered. Written contracts often include clauses for automatic renewal. Some …rms report to have had a written contract only in the …rst year of their relationship with a particular buyer. season. With respect to volumes, the parties typically agree on some minimum volume of orders year around to guarantee the seller a certain level of sales. Parties might, however, agree to allow for a relatively large percentage (e.g., 20%) of orders to be managed "ad hoc". With respect to prices, most …rms negotiate constant prices with their main buyer throughout the year but some have prices changing twice a year, possibly through a catalogue or price list. Prices are not indexed on quality nor on prices prevailing at the Dutch auctions.
Contracts do not specify exclusivity clauses. In particular, contracts do not require …rms to sell all, or even a particular share, of their production to a buyer or to not sell on the spot market. In principle, it would seem possible to write enforceable contracts that prevent …rms from side-selling roses at the auctions. The ability to sell on the spot market, however, gives producers ‡exibility to sell excess production as well as some protection against buyers defaults and/or opportunism. Such contractual provisions might not be desirable.
This paper takes the existence of direct relationships as given and does not explain why relationships coexist along-side a spot-market. 6 Beside lower freight and time costs, a well-functioning relationship provide buyers and sellers with stability. Buyers commitment to purchase pre-speci…ed quantities of roses throughout the season allows sellers to better plan production. Buyers value reliability in supply of roses often sourced from di¤erent regions to be combined into bouquets. Parties trade-o¤ these bene…ts with the costs of managing and nurturing direct relationships in an environment lacking contract enforcement. Figure 1 ). 7 The main consequence of the violence was that …rms located in the regions a¤ected by the violence found themselves lacking signi…cant numbers 6 Similar two-tier market structures have been documented in several markets in developing countries (see Fafchamps (2006) for a review). The coexistence of direct relationships alongside spot markets is also observed in several other contexts, such as perishable agricultural commodities, advertising and diamonds. We are grateful to Jon Levin for pointing this to us. 7 The classi…cation of a¤ected and una¤ected regions is strongly supported by the survey conducted in the summer following the crisis and is not controversial. See Appendix for details. 7 of their workers. Among the 74 …rms surveyed, 42 were located in regions that were directly a¤ected by the violence. Table A1 shows that while …rms located in regions not a¤ected by the violence did not report any signi…cant absence among workers (1%, on average), …rms located in regions a¤ected by the violence reported an average of 50% of their labor force missing during the period of the violence. Furthermore, …rms were unable to completely replace workers. On average, …rms in areas a¤ected by the violence replaced around 5% of their missing workers with more than half of the …rms replacing none. Many …rms paid higher over time wages to remaining workers in order to minimize disruption in production.
Electoral Violence
With many workers missing, …rms su¤ered large reductions in total output. In the survey, we asked several questions about whether the violence had been anticipated or not. Not a single …rm among the 74 producers interviewed reported to have anticipated the shock (and to have adjusted production or sales plans accordingly): the violence has been a large, unanticipated and short-run negative shock to the production function of …rms.
Relationships Characteristics
Using the customs data, we build a dataset of relationships. Overall, we focus on the In total, this gives 189 relationships in the baseline sample. Panel A in Table 1 reports summary statistics for the relationships in the baseline sample. The average relationship had 60 shipments in the 20 weeks preceding the violence. The average age of the relationship in the sample, measured as the number of days from the …rst shipment observed in the data, is 860 days, i.e., two years and a half. Immediately before the violence, contracting parties in the average relationship had transacted with each other 298 times. 8 Exporters specialize in one marketing channel alone. The majority of exporters either sells more than 90% of produce through direct relationships, or through the auctions. As a result, among the one hundred established exporters, only …fty six have at least one direct relationship with a foreign buyer in our baseline sample. On average, therefore, exporters in the sample have three direct relationships (see Panel B
in Table 1 ). Similarly, there are seventy one buyers with at least a relationship in our baseline. The average buyer, therefore, has about two and a half Kenyan suppliers. Figure 4 shows that prices in relationships are more stable than prices at the auctions.
Theory
This section introduces a work horse model of the relationship between a ‡ower producer (seller) and a foreign buyer (buyer). The benchmark case with perfectly enforceable contracts is introduced …rst. The assumption of enforceable contracts is then relaxed. The model predicts stationary dynamics which are inconsistent with the empirical evidence. An extension with uncertainty about seller's reliability is next introduced. The extension matches the empirical evidence and is used to derive further predictions on how sellers react to the violence. The section concludes with a summary of testable implications. 9 
Set Up and First Best
Time is an in…nite sequence of periods t, t = 0; 1; :::The buyer and the seller have an in…nite horizon and share a common discount factor < 1: Periods alternate between 8 These averages are left-censored, since they are computed from August 2004 onward. Since our records begin in April 2004, we are able to distinguish relationships that were new in August 2004 from relationships that were active before. Among the 189 relationships in the baseline sample, 44% are classi…ed as censored, i.e., were already active before August 2004. This con…rms the …ndings of the survey, in which several respondents reported to have had relationships longer than a decade. 9 Section 5 discusses alternative modeling assumptions. All proofs are in the online Appendix.
9 high seasons t = 0; 2; :::and low seasons t = 1; 3:::. Low season variables and parameters are denoted with a lower bar (e.g., x). Similarly, high season variables are denoted with a upper bar (e.g., x).
In each period, the seller can produce q units of roses at cost c(q) = The kink at q captures the buyer's desire for reliability and, for simplicity, we assume
There is also a market for roses where buyers and sellers can trade roses. The price at which sellers can sell, p m t ; oscillates between p m t = p in high seasons and p m t = p < p in low seasons: Let q m be the quantity of roses sold on the market and m be the seller's optimal pro…ts when she does not sell roses to the buyer. The buyer can purchase roses in the market at price p b t = p m t + ; with > 0 capturing additional transport and intermediation cost.
Contracts are negotiated at the beginning of high seasons. Parties agree on constant prices for the high season and the subsequent low season. The buyer has the exante bargaining power and o¤ers contracts at the beginning of the high season. With constant prices, a contract in period t; then, is given by C t = n q t ; q t+1 ; w t o : A contract speci…es quantities to be delivered in the high season t when the contract is negotiated, q t ; in the following low season, q t+1 ; and a unit price to be paid upon delivery of roses, w t ; which is constant across seasons. 10 We omit the period subscript t when this doesn't create confusion and assume:
With perfectly enforceable contracts the buyer o¤ers a contract C = q; q; w to maximize her pro…ts across two subsequent high and low season, i.e., (q; q; w) = r(q) wq + r(q) wq (1) subject to the seller participation constraint
The seller's participation constraint takes into account her sales on the spot market:
for a given contract with the buyer; the seller sets q m and q m to maximize her pro…ts. The optimal contract displays i) lower seasonality in direct sales than in sales to the spot market, and ii) price compression, i.e., p < w < p: Both features are observed in the data. In a relationship with perfect contract enforcement the optimal contract is repeated forever.
Limited Enforcement
As revealed by interviews in the …eld, contracts enforcing the delivery of roses are not available. This, potentially, generates two problems. First, the buyer might refuse to pay the seller once the roses have been delivered. Second, given price compression, the seller might fail to deliver the quantity of roses agreed with the buyer. Buyers and sellers use relational contracts to overcome lack of enforcement.
A relational contract is a plan C R = n q t ; q t+1 ; w t o 1 t=0;2;:::
that speci…es quantities to be delivered, q t and q t+1 ; and unit prices, w t ; for all future high and low seasons.
Parties agree to break-up the relationship and obtain their outside options forever following any deviation. The outside option of the seller is to sell on the market forever and the outside option of the buyer is normalized to zero. The buyer o¤ers the relational contract to maximize the discounted value of future pro…ts
subject to incentive compatibility constraints and the seller's participation constraint.
Denote with U R t and V R t the net present value of the payo¤s from the relationship at time t for the buyer and the seller respectively. Let U O t and V O t denote the net present value of the outside options. The buyer must prefer to pay the seller rather than terminating the relationship, i.e.,
w t q t for all t = 0; 2; :::
and
w t q t+1 for all t = 0; 2; :::
Similarly, the seller must prefer to produce and deliver the roses to the buyer rather than optimally selling on the spot market, i.e.,
(p w t ) q t for all for all t = 0; 2; :::
w t q t+1 + c(q t+1 ) for all t = 0; 2; :::
The relational contract C R is chosen to maximize (3) subject to (4), (5), (6) and (7). 11 Proposition 2: The optimal relational contract is such that q R t = q R ; q R t+1 = q R and w R t = w R < p for all t = 0; 2; :::
The optimal relational contract is stationary. This is a well-known result (see, e.g., Abreu (1988) and Levin (2003) ). The optimal relational contract also displays price compression, i.e., w R < p: Price compression implies that (7) is never binding while constraint (6) always is. Constraint (4) can, therefore, be rewritten as
where
O is the value of the relationship. Lack of enforcement implies that the amount of roses traded is constrained by the future value of the relationship.
The incentive constraints (4) and (6), combined into (8) therefore, implies an elasticity of q R with respect to p equal to minus one.
Seller' s Hidden Types
Interviews in the …eld suggest that concerns over a seller's reputation for reliability are of paramount importance among buyers and sellers. First, delays and irregularity in rose deliveries are costly to the buyer. Second, the sector has expanded rapidly and many sellers lack a previous record of success in export markets. 12 We follow the literature and model reputation introducing uncertainty over types. 13 There are two types of sellers: reliable and unreliable. A reliable seller has a discount factor equal to : An unreliable seller, instead, receives shocks which makes her maximize her instantaneous payo¤. The probability of the shock, ; is known to both parties and is constant over time. At the beginning of the relationship, the buyer believes that the seller is reliable with probability 0 :
Contract terms, trade outcomes and relationship's length are not observed by other market participants. The buyer's outside option is the value of returning to the market to be matched with a new seller of uncertain type. We focus on pooling contracts and equilibria in which the buyer terminates the relationship if the seller is revealed to be unreliable.
The buyer faces a choice between supply assurance and learning. The buyer can o¤er an initial price w R 0 = p and ensure delivery in all periods regardless of the seller's type. A high price, however, is expensive and forces the buyer to trade relatively low quantities of roses. Alternatively, the buyer can o¤er an initial price w R 0 < p: A lower price relaxes the buyer's incentive constraint but exposes the buyer to the risk of non-delivery. As before, the buyer pays rents to the seller in the low season. Delivery failure, therefore, doesn't occur in the low season. However, a delivery failure still occurs with probability (1 0 ) in the …rst high season: Delivery in the high season (but not in the low season), therefore, conveys positive information about the seller's type. After periods of successful delivery the buyer holds beliefs ( ) given by
with 0 ( ) > 0 and 00 ( ) < 0 (for su¢ ciently large ): Conditional on delivery in the high season, the relationship is continued with positively updated beliefs about the seller's type.
Proposition 3:
Suppose (8) is binding at the beginning of the relationship. There exists such that for < the buyer experiments, i.e.: i) w R t < p for all t and ii)
q R t with a strict inequality for at least some initial t:
If is su¢ ciently low, the buyer prefers to risk non-delivery and experiment. Since surplus increases in beliefs, ( ) ; the optimal relational contract is non-stationary and the quantity sourced in the high season, alongside with relationship's value, increases with relationships'age.
The Violence
The violence hits the relationship in the middle of the high season (i.e., before the unreliable type receives the shock to her discount rate). Consider a relationship of age : The seller is supposed to deliver quantity q R at price w R : Because of the violence, the seller can only deliver a share R 2 [0; 1] of q R : The share R depends on unobservable e¤ort e e and on other random factors. The cost of e¤ort is (e):
Denote by e e R and e e U the buyer's beliefs about the e¤ort exerted by the reliable and unreliable types respectively: In the equilibrium: 1) given buyer's beliefs, a reliable seller sets e R and an unreliable seller sets e U to maximize expected payo¤, and 2)
buyer's beliefs are correct. As before, contracts, including adaptations of the relational contract to information revealed at the time of the violence, are negotiated at the beginning of the following high season.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3:
0 (e) = 1:
B(e;e;a)
where a and e are positive constants such that e e and B( ) the appropriate Beta function:
The beta distribution is widely used to model the random behavior of percentages.
In our context, the beta distribution captures the intuition that higher e¤ort makes high R more likely while imposing su¢ cient regularity to derive comparative statics results. In particular, the Beta distribution implies i ) E [Rje] = e e ; i.e., expected reliability is linear in e¤ort, ii ) monotone likelihood ratio, i.e., relatively higher R is a signal of relatively higher e¤ort, iii ) higher e¤ort makes all states above a certain threshold more likely and all states below less likely.
Proposition 4: Consider a relationship in which w R < p: In a separating equilibrium in which e R > e U ; there exists a threshold e R > 0 such that if R < e R the seller doesn't deliver any rose to the buyer and the relationship is terminated. Moreover, if q R and b V ( ) = (p w ) q R increase in ; the (expected) share of roses transacted at the time of the violence is increasing in relationship's age if e :
In a separating equilibrium in which e R > e U , a high R conveys positive information about the seller's type. A su¢ ciently low R leads to beliefs that are too pessimistic to sustain the relational contract. Anticipating this, the seller sells the available roses on the spot market and the relationship ends. The last part of the proposition follows from the trade-o¤ between the higher incentives provided by the desire to protect a higher relationship's value b V against the standard diminished reputational incentives implied by su¢ ciently optimistic prior beliefs .
Conditional on the survival of the relationship, i.e., R e R ; the relational contract is renegotiated at the beginning of the following high season. The new relational contract is negotiated based on updated beliefs that depend on beliefs prior to the violence, ( ) ; equilibrium e¤ort levels, e R and e U ; and observed reliability R. These updated beliefs, e R; e e R ; e e U ; induce relationship value S( e ) in the high season following the violence. The relationship value S( e ) is (weakly) increasing in e . Denoting (R) = f (Rje e R )=f (Rje e U ), the updated beliefs are given by
The e¤ect of reliability R on updated beliefs and, therefore, on relationship's value S( e ); is positive for all relationship's age and becomes negligible when prior beliefs are su¢ ciently optimistic:
Summary
The model provides the following three testable predictions: 4 Empirical Results
Incentive Constraints and the Value of Relationships
The incentive compatibility constraints (4) and (6), aggregated into (8), provide lower bounds to the value of the relationship for the buyer, the seller and the relationship as a whole. We denote these lower bounds as U; V and S respectively. From an empirical point of view, the appeal of the incentive constraints is that q R t ; p and w R t are directly observable in the data. The computation of the lower bounds U , V and S; therefore, does not rely on information on the cost structure of the …rm, nor on expectations of future trade between the parties, which are typically unobservable and/or di¢ cult to estimate.
Recall that the model implies that only the maximum temptation to deviate has to be considered to obtain an estimate of a lower bound to the value of the relationship.
For each relationship and season, therefore, we compute the lower bounds focusing on the time in which the value of the roses on the market, q R t p; is highest. In bringing the constraint to the data, we need to choose a temptation window, i.e., the length of the period of time during which the temptation is computed. For simplicity, we focus on temptation windows of a week. 14 Denote calendar weeks with ! and let q R i;t! be the quantity traded in relationship i and p i;t! be auction prices in week ! of season t: Using unit weight of roses transacted in relationship i, it is possible to use auction prices for large and small roses to index p i;t! by relationship i: For each relationship i in season t; de…ne week ! it as the one with the largest aggregate temptation to deviate, i.e.,
The lower bounds to the value of relationship i in season t, denoted by b S it ; b U it and 1 4 Results are robust to considering longer temptation windows.
b V it ; are given then by
where w i;t! denotes the price paid in relationship i in week ! of season t: Together
; b S it ; b U it and b V it are the main outcomes in the empirical speci…cations.
The variation in the estimated values across time and relationships, therefore, comes from di¤erent sources: i ) the timing of the highest aggregate temptation, ! it ;
ii ) quantities transacted during the relevant window, q R i;t! it ; iii ) prices at the auction during the relevant window p t! it ; and iv ) prices in the relationships during the relevant window, w i;t! it : Within seasons, prices in relationships are quite stable, i.e., w i;t! ' w i;t : Conditional on unit weight of roses, prices at the auctions do not vary across relationships. Table 2 . The week of Valentine's day is ! it in about 40% of relationships.
Other prominent weeks are around Mother's days, which typically fall in March (e.g., UK, Russia, Japan) or later in May (e.g., other European countries and U.S.) depending on the country. Since prices at the auctions are predictable (see Figure 3) , the estimated values are not driven by unexpectedly high prices.
For the 189 relationships in the baseline sample, Panel C in Table 1 shows that the aggregate value of the relationship b S in the season that preceded the violence was 578% of the average weekly revenues in the average relationship. The values for the buyer b U and seller b V respectively are 387% and 191% of average weekly revenues. 15 The latter observation, however, cannot be interpreted as evidence that the value of a relationship increases with age. Mechanically, the estimated value of a relationship that is too young to have gone through a seasonal peak is low. Table 2 presents correlation patterns between relationship age and the four outcomes of interest b
Test 1: Relationship' s Outcomes and Age
and b V it : Equation (9) in the theory section shows that beliefs about the seller's type are an increasing and (eventually) concave function of the past number of shipments in which prices at the auctions were higher than prices in the relationship. Accordingly, we measure age of the relationship as the log of the number of past shipments during which prices at the auctions were higher than prices in the relationship and denote this variable as log(N T it ): For all outcomes y 2 fQ; S; U; V g odd numbered columns
in Table 2 report results that exploit cross-sectional variation in the season before the violence, i.e.,
where f and b are exporter and buyer …xed e¤ects respectively and " f b is an error term. The regression is estimated in the sample of relationships that were active in the season before the violence.
From a cross-section it is not possible to disentangle age and cohort e¤ects. The inclusion of buyer and seller …xed e¤ects controls for cohort e¤ects at the contractualparty level, but does not control for relationship cohort e¤ects, i.e., the fact that more valuable relationships might have started earlier. Even numbered columns in Table   2 , therefore, present results from an alternative speci…cation that exploits the time variation across seasons. This allows to include relationship …xed e¤ects that control for time-invariant relationship characteristics, including cohort e¤ects. Normally, even with panel data it is not possible to separately identify age, cohort and season e¤ects since, given a cohort, age and seasons would be collinear. However, our measure of the age of the relationship, log (N T f b ) ; is a non-linear function of calendar time and, therefore, allows us to include season …xed e¤ects, i.e.,
where f b are relationship …xed e¤ects, t season …xed e¤ects and " f bt is an error term.
The selection e¤ect documented in Figure 6 could induce a spurious positive correlation. The speci…cation is therefore estimated on a balanced sample of relationships that where active in all three seasons prior to the violence.
Results in Table 2 indicate a strong, positive, correlation between relationship's age and outcomes. Regardless of whether cross-sectional or time variation are used, the age of the relationship positively correlates with i ) volumes traded at the time of the highest temptation b Q it (columns 1 and 2) , ii ) the aggregate value of the relationship b S it (columns 3 and 4), iii ) the value of the relationship for the buyer b U it (columns 5 and 6) and iv ) for the seller b V it (columns 7 and 8). 16 
Test 2: Binding Incentive Constraint
The results in Table 2 (8) is binding. Table 3 provides evidence suggesting that constraint (8) is binding in many relationships.
The logic for testing whether (8) is binding is as follows. In the model, the future value of the relationship, b S it ; does not depend on current auction prices. If (8) is binding, therefore, a small increase in prices at the auctions should lead to a corresponding decrease in the quantity b Q it : Table 3 reports correlations between prices at the auctions and relationship's value b S it (column 1) and quantities b Q it (column 2) in the week of the highest temptation to deviate. In practice, relationship's value might depend on expectations of future prices at the auctions. Figure 3 shows that seasonal variation in auction prices is highly predictable. Controlling for season and seasonality …xed e¤ects, therefore, should account for parties expectations about future auction prices. Seasonality …xed e¤ects are accounted for by including dummies for the week of the season during which the highest temptation to deviate occurs. The combination of season and seasonality e¤ects implies that variation in prices at the auctions captures small unanticipated variation around the expected prices. Table 3 shows that higher prices at the auctions lead to a proportional reduction in 1 6 The results in Table 2 are extremely robust to a variety of di¤erent assumptions and speci…cations. In particular: 1) outcomes b Qit; b Sit; b Uit and b Vit and age can be measured in levels, instead of logs; 2) age can also be measured as the number of previous shipments, or the calendar time from the …rst shipment in the relationship; 3) relationships for which estimated b
Vit are negative can also be included (assigning them value of zero); 4) relationship controls, including week of maximum temptation to deviate ! f b dummies, can be included; and 5) we do not …nd evidence of any di¤erence in results between relationships in the con ‡ict and no-con ‡ict regions. Results are available upon request. quantity traded (column 2) and that, as a result, the aggregate value of roses traded remains constant (column 1). The estimated elasticity between b Q it and auction prices is equal to ( 0:884); which is very close (and not statistically di¤erent from) to the ( 1) implied by a binding (8) . Increasing prices paid to the seller does not help relaxing the aggregate incentive constraint (8) since a reduction in the seller's temptation to deviate is compensated by an equal increase in the buyer's temptation. Column (3) shows that prices at the auctions do not lead to higher prices in the relationship. 17 Taken together, the evidence is consistent with information from interviews suggesting that parties often agree to allow for a percentage (e.g., 20%) of orders to be managed "ad hoc" and avoid price renegotiations during the season.
Test 3: Predictions of the Reputation Model
Reliability For each relationship, we obtain a predicted shipment of roses on a particular day. We aggregate these predicted value at the week level. The model predicts more than 80%
of both in and out of sample variation in weekly shipments for the median relationship in the sample.
Denote by y f b the observed shipments of roses in the relationship between …rm f and buyer b during the week of the violence, and by b y f b the predicted shipments of roses in the same relationship, obtained using the observed shipments in the week immediately before the violence and the coe¢ cients from the relationship speci…c model 1 7 Figure 7 provides further evidence that parties adjust to unanticipated ‡uctuations in auctions prices. The Figure shows that number of relationships ending in a given week does not correlate with price at the auctions in that week during the seasons preceding the violence period. Regardless of whether week dummies are controlled for or not, the level of prices at the auctions does not predict the number of relationships ending. 20 described above. Reliability at the time of the violence is given by Table 4 shows that the violence reduced reliability b R f b . Table 4 reports results from the regression The reliability measure b R f b is a deviation from a relationships-speci…c counterfactual that accounts for relationship-speci…c average and seasonal ‡uctuations in exports.
The controls included in speci…cation (16), then, allow the violence period to have a¤ected export volumes in a particular relationship di¤erentially across buyers, sellers and relationship characteristics. 18 Table 4 shows that the violence reduced reliability. The Table reports results using di¤erent empirical speci…cations that di¤er in the number of controls included.
In column 4, which controls for buyer …xed e¤ects as well as …rm and relationship controls, reliability was almost 20% lower, on average, in relationships of …rms located in the con ‡ict region. 19 
Reliability and Relationship's Age
Given the positive correlation between relationship age and value for the seller found in Table 2 , the reputation model predicts that sellers in older relationships have stronger incentives to exert e¤ort during the violence and deliver roses to the buyers. 1 8 The results from speci…cation (16), therefore, are equivalent to those of a regression of volumes of exports e y f b s at time in season s; on relationship-speci…c seasonality and season …xed e¤ects, f b and f bs ; in which the e¤ects of the violence are recovered from an interaction between a dummy for the period of the violence, v s; and a dummy for the con ‡ict region, c f , after controlling for the interactions between v s and seller, buyer and relationship characteristics.
On the other hand, in very old relationships, relatively little uncertainty might be left regarding the seller's type. In those cases, even low delivery would not lead to overly pessimistic beliefs about the seller's type. The model, therefore, predicts a (initially) positive and, potentially, inverted-U relationship between reliability and age. Table 5 reports results from the regression
where b are buyer …xed e¤ects and Z f b are relationship controls described above. This speci…cation is very similar to equation (16) 
Reliability and Relationship's Survival
The model predicts that reliability at the time of the violence correlates with subsequent outcomes in the relationships. We focus on the period starting from the beginning of the season following the violence, i.e., after mid August 2008. This is the period in which buyers and sellers (re-)negotiate the relational contract for the new season. 141) in the con ‡ict region; 3) a speci…cation pooling both regions …nds similar results, with lower precision depending on the set of interactions included. In all cases b 1 =2 b 2 ' 5 in the con ‡ict region while no statistically signi…cant pattern is found in the no-con ‡ict region. Results are available upon request. 2 1 The model implies a minimum level of reliability e R > 0: any delivery below the threshold leads to beliefs which are too pessimistic for the relationship to be continued. Consistently with the implication of the model, the minimum level of observed reliability in the con ‡ict region is around 30%.
More relationships did not survive to the following season in the con ‡ict region (16 out of 94, i.e., 17%) than in the no-con ‡ict region (8 out of 95, i.e., 8.5%). The di¤er-ence in survival rate is statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. Table 6 explores the relationship between reliability, age and relationship survival in the two regions separately. In the con ‡ict region (columns 1 and 2) reliability positively correlates with relationships' survival. No such relationship is found in the no-con ‡ict region (columns 3 and 4). 22 Since relationship's value and reliability increase with age ( Table   2 and Table 5 respectively), Table 6 implies that the violence destroyed relatively less valuable relationships in the con ‡ict region. relationships were lower than prices on the spot market. Table A2 in the Appendix shows that, despite higher prices at the auctions, export volumes to the spot market dropped signi…cantly more than export volumes to direct buyers. This di¤erential response holds controlling for seller …xed e¤ects, i.e., comparing sales to the two channels within the same …rm. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that …rms that specialize in selling to direct buyers retained higher percentages of their workers during the violence. 24 Firms could retain workers by, e.g., setting up camps on or around the farm for workers threatened by the violence and paying higher wages to compensate over time for workers that were still working on the farm. The correlation holds controlling for characteristics of the …rm's labor force (education, gender, ethnicity, contract type and housing programs), as well as …rm characteristics (ownership type, certi…cations and land size). In sum, we …nd evidence that …rms exerted e¤orts along at least two margins to respond to the violence.
Relationship Outcomes Conditional on Survival
log (b y f b ) = f + b + 1 log b R f b + 2 log (N T f b )+ 3 log b R f b log (N T f b )+ Z f b +" f b ;(18)
Discussion
The evidence strongly supports the predictions of the reputation model: i ) relationship dynamics are non-stationary (Test 1), ii ) the aggregate incentive constraint (8) appears to be binding in many relationships (Test 2) and iii ) the reaction to the violence are consistent with further predictions of the reputation model (Test 3), e.g., the nonlinear relationship between age and reliability and the long-run e¤ects of reliability.
Before concluding, several points are worth discussing. We …rst consider the role of unobserved rose characteristics and then discuss some of the key assumptions of the model and how the evidence relates to alternative theoretical models. 2 3 Results in Table 7 are qualitatively similar in a number of alternative speci…cations. In particular, 1) the use of reliability in level (instead of log); 2) a pooled regression gives similar results with lower statistical signi…cance on outcomes b Q and b S; 3) results are stronger when using levels of outcome variables. Results are available upon request. 2 4 The Table also appears in Ksoll et al. (2013) . 24 
Unobserved Rose Characteristics
The value of a rose mainly depends on i ) its size, which we can proxy with unit weights reported in the customs data, and ii ) its variety which, unfortunately, is not reported.
Unobserved characteristics of roses present two main concerns for our results. A …rst concern regards the seller's incentive constraint (6) and its empirical implementation in (12) . To estimate the lower bound to the value of the relationship we assumed that the roses can be sold at the auctions. A violation of the assumption introduces measurement error. The auctions are an extremely liquid market in which hundreds of rose varieties are traded each day. Conversations with practitioners suggest that the assumption is likely to be valid in most cases. Still, it is possible that for some relationships the assumption is violated at the time of the highest temptation to deviate.
Three aspects of the empirical results are somewhat reassuring regarding the importance of this source of measurement error. First, Table A4 in the Appendix shows that, within …rms, there is no di¤erence in the average and standard deviation of unit weights sold to direct buyers and to the auctions. Second, the predictions of the model hold for two outcome variables, b Q and b U ; that do not directly depend on prices at the auctions. Third, the evidence of a binding incentive constraint (8) in Table 3 suggests that side-selling to the auction is the relevant deviation in most relationships.
A second concern is that …rms might export to di¤erent buyers varieties of roses that are di¤erentially a¤ected by the violence (e.g., more labour intensive or perishable varieties). If those rose characteristics correlate with the age of the relationship, the results in Table 2 might be biased. Table A4 shows that average and standard deviation of unit weights do not correlate with the age of the relationship. Further (unreported) results show that average and standard deviation of unit weights do not change with season and at the time of the violence within relationships. To the extent that data allow, we do not …nd evidence that unobserved rose characteristics pose a threat to our results.
Assumptions in the Model
Motivated by interviews in the …eld, we assumed that contracts are negotiated at the beginning of the high season and that prices are constant across seasons. The complexity associated with indexing contracts on weekly auction prices, the inability of sellers and courts to observe the quality of roses delivered and a desire to smooth seasonality in income pro…les are likely forces behind the use of constant prices. We abstract from these forces and take constant prices as a fact of commercial life in our environment. If prices varied across seasons, the qualitative insights of the benchmark and pure enforcement model would be una¤ected. The analysis of the model with types, however, would require a di¤erent formulation of types and would become more involved.
A second assumption is that outside options do not change over time. The assumption is justi…ed by the fact that outside options are likely to be functions of seller's speci…c, rather than relationship's speci…c, variables that evolve over time. The empirical analysis controls for seller's …xed e¤ects, e¤ectively comparing relationships holding constant seller's speci…c factors that could determine outside options.
We have focused our attention on pooling contracts. In models with dynamic adverse selection it is possible, but potentially very costly, to screen types (see, e.g., La¤ont and Tirole (1988) ). In our model, both types receive the same pay-o¤ which is equivalent to their outside option. Screening, therefore, would require paying future rents to the reliable type. The buyer's incentive constraint, however, places limits on future payments to the seller potentially limiting the availability of separating contracts.
We have assumed that, following the violence, contracts are renegotiated at the beginning of the following high season. The assumption simpli…es the de…nition of the Bayesian equilibrium following the violence and the derivation of the results in Proposition 4. The unforeseen nature of the shock, the distance between buyers and sellers and the need for a prompt response make the assumption appealing from an empirical point of view as well.
Informal Insurance
Insurance considerations could also be important determinants of the value of relationships in this context. 25 Informal insurance models also predict non-stationary outcomes: past realizations of shocks in ‡uence future continuation values. Because past realization of shocks are unobservable it is di¢ cult to reject informal insurance models. The results, however, suggest that insurance considerations are unlikely to be driving how relationships reacted to the violence. First, insurance models predict that relationships with higher promised value should give more slack to the seller. The evidence suggests the opposite is true: older, and more valuable, relationships tend to have higher reliability. Second, insurance considerations imply the use of both current transfers and future values to provide incentives. In contrast, Figure A2 in the Appendix shows that the distribution of prices at the time of the violence is very similar to its counterpart in the twenty weeks before the violence. Prices were not renegotiated upward at the time of the violence.
Alternative Modeling Assumptions
Levin (2003) Other modeling assumptions, however, imply non-stationary outcomes without assuming learning. When there is moral hazard and the buyer privately observes the quality of the roses delivered stationary contracts are no longer optimal. Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007) , however, show that the optimal contract is a termination contract in which trade between parties continues in a stationary fashion provided performance is above a certain threshold during a certain period of time. If performance falls below the threshold, the relationship ends. The evidence is, therefore, also inconsistent with this extension of the model. that either party has private information about her outside option and also obtains non-stationary outcomes. In the special case in which the buyer has the bargaining power and the seller has private information, however, the model predicts stationary outcomes. 26 
Conclusion
Imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real-life commercial transactions. In the absence of formal contract enforcement trading parties rely on the future rents associated with long term relationships to deter short-term opportunism and facilitate trade. Empirical evidence on the structure of informal arrangements in supply relationships between …rms has the potential to identify salient microeconomic frictions in speci…c contexts and inform policy, particularly in a development context. This paper presents an empirical study of supply relationships in the Kenya rose export sector, a context particularly well-suited to study informal relationships between …rms.
We …nd evidence consistent with models in which sellers value acquiring and maintaining a reputation for reliability. From a policy perspective, it is important to know whether learning and reputation are important determinants of …rms' success in export markets. Firms might have to operate at initial losses in order to acquire a good reputation. Furthermore, if reputation is an important determinant of contractual outcomes, prior beliefs about sellers a¤ect buyers willingness to trade, at least for a while. This generates externalities across sellers and over time, justifying commonly observed institutions such as certi…cations, business associations and subsidies to joint marketing activities.
Proof of Proposition 1
Assumption > v implies that the buyer never purchases roses in the market.
Assumption v > p implies that the buyer's willingness to pay is higher than market prices in both seasons. As a result, the buyer o¤ers q = q = q : Assumption p = 0 is made for convenience alone, and implies q m = 0: Assumption cq < p implies that the marginal cost of producing q is smaller than the price in the market in the high season and, therefore, q m = p c q : The price w is set by the buyer and, following standard arguments, can be recovered from the binding participation constraint. Simple algebra
:
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof that the constrained optimal relational contract is stationary and, therefore, q R t = q R and q R t+1 = q R for all t = 0; 2:::follows standard arguments (e.g., Abreu
(1988) and Levin (2003) ) and is omitted. The logic of the proof is that with risk neutral parties and publicly observed history there is no need to distort future continuation values to provide incentives.
Suppose instead that w R = p: Obviously, q R < q and cq > p implies that seller's pro…ts in the low season are strictly positive,
pro…ts in the high season in the relationships are equal to pro…ts in the spot market, since w R = p: The buyer could, therefore, lower the price by a small amount "; still satisfy seller's constraints (6) and (7) and increase pro…ts. Increasing pro…ts at any date only helps satisfying buyer's constraints (4) and (5). A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider …rst the strategy that delivers supply assurance. Suppose the buyer decides to pay w sa 0 = p, i.e., she does not experiment in the …rst period. Then, delivery of roses does not lead to any belief updating. If it is optimal not to learn in the …rst period, then it is also not optimal to learn in future periods as well. The contract is then stationary and since (4) is assumed to be binding in the …rst period, it will be binding forever. The net present value of the relationship for the buyer at time zero is then given by U (4) and increases q e 0 : U e 0 is therefore monotonically decreasing in : Consider now the case in which ! 0; i.e., the likelihood of a delivery failure is arbitrarily small. Then 
Proof of Proposition 4
First note that the Beta distribution satis…es the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR), i.e., for all e H > e L ; (R) = f (Rje H )=f (Rje L ) is strictly increasing in R: This implies that low reliability is interpreted by the buyer as a signal of relatively lower e¤ort.
Moreover, lim R!0 (R) = 0 and lim
Suppose the buyer believes that e R > e U : Denote with (R) = f (Rje e R )=f (Rje e U ).
Conditional on observing R; the beliefs of the buyer in the separating equilibrium are given by e R; e e R ; e e U = (R) (R) + (1 ) :
Recall that buyers terminate relationships when the seller is revealed to be an unreliable type, i.e., if = 0. At the same time, relationships are started under prior 0 :
Therefore, the fact that lim R!0 (R) = 0 implies that there exists a threshold e 0 such that if e R; e e R ; e e U e the buyer terminates the relationship. Monotonicity of e R; e e R ; e e U with respect to R implies the existence of a threshold e R implicitely de…ned by e R; e e R ; e e U = e : If R e R the relationship is terminated. If R > e R the relationship continues with beliefs as in (19) .
We now check that for all buyer's beliefs such that e e R > e e U a reliable type has indeed higher incentives to exert e¤ort. Consider the incentives of both types to exert e¤ort. Denote with V i e R; e e R ; e e U the continuation values associated with posterior beliefs e R; e e R ; e e U for a seller of type i 2 fR; U g: Continuation values
V i e ( ) only depend on the realization of R; buyer's beliefs about e¤ort levels e e i ,
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and . V i e ( ) is, therefore, taken as given by the seller. The seller's incentives depend on the gains of making high R states more likely and low R states less likely:
The equilibrium requires e e i = e i for each i 2 fR; U g and e e R > e e U :
Each type i 2 fR; U g choses e¤ort as follows:
Denoting with V i e (R; ) = R 1 0 V i e (R; )
Consider …rst the reliable type. Since contracts are not renegotiated until the following high season and the participation constraint of the seller is binding, the value for a reliable type is given by
For the unreliable type, instead, we have
The binding constraint ( 
The second part of the proposition compares the incentives of a reliable type at age and 0 ; with 0 > : Substituting (22) in the …rst order condition (21), we obtain
Noting that
e and using the binding constraint (8), the …rst order condition becomes and also involved the towns of Naivasha and Limuru. 2 7 DEPHA provides geographic information data and services to the region under the UN. DEPHA maps of the violence were accessed at http://www.depha.org/Post_election_Violence.asp on September 23 rd ; 2008. 2 8 Ushahidi is an open-source site launched to gather information from the general public on the events in real time. The general public could on a map of Kenya pin up a town/area where con ‡ict had erupted and when. Source: Authors calculations from HCDA Transaction level data on all flower exports. The sample is given by all relationships active immediately before the violence, i.e., only relationships that had more than 20 transactions from the beginning of the season. Left censored refers to relationships that were already active before the beginning of the period covered in the data, i.e., relationships that were active before September 2004. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports correlations between the main relationships outcomes and two measures of the age of the relationship: number of previous shipments and past temptations, i.e., number of previous shipments at times in which auctions prices were higher than the relationship's price. All variables are in logs. The outcomes are computed for all seasons before the violence and the sample refers to relationships that were active during the period. The sample excludes relationships that are in the baseline sample but were not active in the season preceding the violence and includes relationships that did not survive until the violence season. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports correlations between prices at the auctions and relationships outcomes at the time of the maximum temptation to deviate. All variables are in logs. The outcomes are computed for all seasons before the violence and the sample refers to relationships that were active during the period. The sample excludes relationships that are in the baseline sample but were not active in the season preceding the violence and includes relationships that did not survive until the violence season. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis.
Table 4: The Violence Reduced Exports in Direct Relationships
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports the difference in mean in estimated reliability between direct relationships of firms located in regions directly affected by the violence against direct relationships of firms located in regions not directly affected. Reliability is computed as the ratio of realized exports over predicted exports during the second spike of the violence. The predicted values are obtained by fitting a relationships specific regression of shipments in any given day of the week with shipments in the corresponding day for the previous week, taking into account seasonality patterns. For the median relationship in the sample, this regression has an R-square equal to 0.85. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parenthesis.
[ ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports correlations between measures of the age of the relationship and reliability at the time of the violence. Reliability is computed as in Table 4 . All variables are in logs. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table shows that the violence has destroyed relationships for which reliability at the time of the violence was sufficiently low. No relationship exists between reliability and relationship survival in regions not affected by the violence. Reliability is computed as in Table 4 . The sample is given by all relationships active immediately before the violence. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The sample is given by the set of surviving relationships in the season after the violence. Regressions controls include volumes, prices and frequency of transactions in the period before the violence. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Firm controls include size, number of relationships, and share of exports to direct relationships. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
[ 
Figure 2: Effect of Violence on Export Volumes
The figure shows the median biweekly residual of a regression that controls for firm specific seasonality and growth patterns in conflict and in non-conflict locations for the 10 weeks before and 10 weeks after the first outbreak of violence. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix. Table 2 . The temptation to deviate is the value at the auctions of quantities traded in a relationship in a week. In a given season, the maximum temptation to deviate is given by the highest temptation to deviate during the season. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix. The Figure shows that the number of relationships dying in a given week does not correlate with the price at the Auctions in that week during the two season preceding the violence period. This is consistent with the fact that prices at the auctions are highly predictable. In a regression of the number of relationships dying in a given week that controls for week and season dummies, the coefficient on the violence period is positive and significant. The R-square for the same regression is 0.57. Regardless of whether week dummies are controlled for or not, the level of prices at the auctions does not predict the number of relationships dying. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix. 
